NYLS Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 3 Volume XLI, Numbers 3 & 4, 1997

Article 21

January 1997

GIVING IT AWAY: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SEC IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE CHARITY
Richard C. Breeden

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard C. Breeden, GIVING IT AWAY: OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SEC IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE CHARITY, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1179 (1997).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

GIVING IT AWAY:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SEC IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE CHARITY
RICHARD C. BREEDENW

First, let me say thank you very much to New York Law School and
particularly the Law Review, for putting on this very fine program.
It is nice to be able to be on what is, by any definition, a perfect
panel. We have a professor named "Faith," the audience, no doubt,
harbors the "hope" that I will be brief, and we are all discussing
"charity." It is not often that you can combine faith, hope, and charity in
one program.
As the last speaker of the day, I would like to wind up this symposium
by offering some observations on the role of the SEC, because so many
of the panelists have talked about the SEC as if it is the grand solution to
this problem. This reminds me of when Drexel Burnham was about to go
off a cliff due to a liquidity crisis, and its then CEO kept calling every day
suggesting that we might bail them out. After the third or fourth such call
suggesting that the federal government might want to pay Drexel's debts
I remember telling the CEO that "if you think you hear horses, it is not
the cavalry." Likewise, I am not sure that the SEC is the cavalry for this
particular problem, although it does raise some fascinating issues.
When I served in two Republican administrations, culminating in
serving as Chairman of the SEC, I was a great believer in deregulation.
It is a particularly challenging thing to maintain your self-esteem in a
Republican administration while being a regulator, since some of your
colleagues would like to abolish all regulation. Of course at the SEC, we
were always in favor of deregulating things, or at least reducing
regulations where its burdens and costs exceed its benefits.' While we
were committed to making securities regulation flexible, efficient and
minimally intrusive on market mechanisms, I would occasionally remind
my colleagues that, in my view, the proper definition of the completely
unregulated taking of money belonging to someone else is "theft."
* Mr. Breeden is President and CEO of Richard C. Breeden & Co. in Greenwich,

CT. He served as the Chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission from 19891993, and previously served as Assistant to the President and other positions in the White
House. He is a 1975 graduate of the Harvard Law School.
1. These steps included creation of the Rule 144A market for securities purchased
by qualified institutional buyers; creation of new, shorter forms under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for small businesses; broad new
exemptions for asset backed securities under the Investment Company Act; proposed
legislation to exempt private investment funds for sophisticated investors; proposals to
repeal state "Blue Sky" regulation of securities offerings, and many similar steps.
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Therefore, if our other panelists are correct that the donation of money
that unequivocally belongs to the shareholders is now unregulated in
America, we could have a slight problem.
Philanthropy is something that has a long, long tradition in America,
and we are all quite proud of it. Among other things, it makes America
unique, particularly compared to the business communities of Europe and
Asia. Americans, as individuals and as reflected in their institutions, have
a deep commitment to philanthropy and a desire and belief that we should
all do something to help our fellow citizens, particularly those less
fortunate. Therefore, if I were still in government, I would not want to
touch the issue of "regulating" corporate philanthropy with a 500 foot
pole. The risk of being labeled Scrooge at the SEC by even discussing the
question would be too great,2 even if one's objective would be to minimize
dividends to shareholders so they could make their own charitable
donations.
As an outside observer, it is now easier to discuss areas where
corporations may, in essence, be wasting shareholder assets without proper
accountability. However, I disagree with the suggestion of one of our
professor panelists that corporate use of sky boxes at sporting events is
abusive. Perhaps it is a gender issue, but no one could possibly question,
when sitting behind home plate, the value of that corporate expenditure.
Perhaps this illustrates the subjectivity that quickly arises in this area.
There are several interesting questions raised by the broader issue of
proper accountability for gifts of corporate property. One is, of course,
what should be done? If you have a sense that something is at least out
of balance, what should you do about it? And an equally important
question if something should be done is, who should do it? And when you
have done it, then how do you report it?
I am currently serving as a bankruptcy trustee and doing turn-around
work. The company that I am presently overseeing is called the Bennett
Funding Group, which has the dubious distinction of being the scene of the
largest ponzi scheme in American history.3 Bennett is a group of affiliated
companies which in the last six years sold $2,137,000,000 worth of
unregistered, and now largely worthless, securities. Bennett routinely
2. We did impose disclosure requirements on legacy contributions on behalf of
directors under the proxy rules, however.
3. See SEC v. Bennett Funding Group, No. 96-61376, 1996 WL 179996, at *1

(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1996) (alleging that Bennett Funding Group engaged in a
massive ongoing "Ponzi" scheme by selling tens of millions of dollars of lease
assignments for office equipment leases that simply did not exist, including the assignment

of over $55 million of fictitious and supposedly tax-exempt New York City Transit
Authority leases).
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pledged equipment leases to multiple buyers, as well as selling phony
leases.
The origins of the Bennett Funding case, like many of the worst and
most flagrant cases of corporate abuse, may ultimately arise out of a
simple, common tendency on the part of misguided management in these
companies to think that they can treat the corporation as their own
personal kitty. In fact, we called the main repository of accounts of this
particular company, in which incoming funds from investors as well as
payments from lessees were deposited, the honey pot, and that is exactly
the way corporate officers treated it. They paid legitimate corporate
expenses out of the honey pot. They also bought racetracks and casinos,
went on trips and did anything that they felt like doing with the funds in
this account. There seemed to be absolutely no capability or desire to
distinguish between money that belonged to other people and money that
belonged to the family members who ran the company.
So any time in the stewardship of shareholder funds that corporate
management is not sensitive to the fact that it is dealing with other
people's money, and that it has a fiduciary duty to use the money wisely,
then there is a problem. There is also a broader issue of making sure that
management understands the limits and accountability by which it must
live.
If profligate corporate charity is a problem as the other panelists have
argued, then who is going to do something about it? At the federal level,
the SEC and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are probably the two most
logical agencies, and perhaps the ERISA division of the Department of
Labor. However, as the Business Round Table never tired of telling us
at the SEC, the SEC does not have the power to create corporate law,
which is a job reserved to the states. So, the SEC is not a general purpose
doctor for corporate legal issues. Similarly, efforts to use the tax code for
corporate governance social engineering, though not uncommon, have had
only limited success. 4
It is a widely held tenet that we do not and should not have a federal
corporate law in this country. The states have a long history in this area.
Having multiple sources of corporate law gives the states the ability to act
as a laboratory for experiment, and that is a good thing. Monopolists in
government behave no more effectively than monopolists in private life,
so anything that Uncle Sam does because of its monopolistic characteristics
can have some very deleterious effects. Thus, for good reasons, even the
SEC itself does not wish to become the law giver of basic corporate law.
4. The Clinton Administration's limitation on deductibility of executive compensation
if not done in a specified manner is unlikely to prove effective in addressing such a

complex issue. However, tax legislation promoting employee stock ownership may have
had a more successful record.
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Indeed, when the SEC has been perceived to have gone in that direction,
the courts have not hesitated to call it short. 5
The SEC's role in the proxy area provides an interesting contrast.
Here the SEC has long had an express statutory role in regulating the use
of proxies.' The SEC does not require corporations to hold an annual
meeting (and quite possibly does not have legal authority to do so), but it
does regulate the process by which votes are solicited for any meetings
that are held, as well as specifying the content of required disclosure. In
the 1980s when the SEC was concerned that companies had gone too far
in the differential voting rights area and tried to promulgate a rule
requiring "one share, one vote," the courts held that that was ultra vires
to the SEC. 7 Yet, if the SEC wants to specify that all corporate proxies,
the ballots themselves, must all be printed on purple paper, that is within
the agency's statutory power.
So the SEC tiptoes along in the corporate governance area, with an
omnipresent shadow of doubt surrounding the question of the breadth of
the SEC's own mandate. The SEC certainly has a role to play in
corporate governance, but there are limits to that role, and the
Commission has to be terribly careful that it does not intrude on the proper
role of the states. Equally important, the SEC must not intrude into the
proper role of the market itself in disciplining aberrational behavior. And
when I say the market itself, I include not only stock prices, but also the
actions of directors.
In my era, we took up several critical issues in the area of corporate
governance and proxy reform. We felt the rules concerning basic
shareholder communications with one another had not kept up with market
demographics or with technology. Therefore, we set out to revise the
proxy rules seeking to remove requirements that could chill the robust
exercise of freedom of speech concerning corporate governance issues.
We also sought to improve our disclosure rules, particularly concerning
corporate compensation, so that market mechanisms could do a better job
of disciplining abusive conduct.
Actually, most of what the SEC does as regulation is really done in
the form of disclosure. However, how something is taxed and how people
are required to tell their neighbors about it are two very effective ways in
5. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating rule barring
national security exchanges and associations from listing stock of corporations which

nullify, restrict or disparately reduce per share voting rights of common stock
shareholders).

6. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1994).

7. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407.
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which the activity can be "regulated," generally with less cost and more
flexibility than prescriptive rules of conduct. In the compensation area,
our SEC never considered that it knew how much companies should pay
their CEOs. However, we did believe that shareholders were entitled to
know what was paid, who decided to pay it, and what factors they
considered in making this decision.8
In recent years, the rules on disclosure of compensation had become
outdated. The country is now populated with consultants whose thriving
business is dreaming up new ways to pay people. Over the years, the new
forms of compensation had gone well beyond the things called for in the
SEC's disclosure requirements.
As a result, we set out to try and capture, preferably in one simple
table, all the elements of compensation that were received by management.
Having a comprehensive disclosure of all compensation is important so
that the shareholders are aware of what is being done with their money.
This disclosure is also critical to allowing oversight and accountability to
take place through the board of directors and, to a lesser degree perhaps,
informed shareholders. In the compensation area, there were signs that
these oversight mechanisms might not be working effectively. The
problem, as we defined it, was not that compensation was too high, but
that there were too many cases in which compensation seemed to show no
correlation to performance. No one should quarrel if someone who makes
all the shareholders rich is richly rewarded. However, if the company is
stagnating or heading for bankruptcy, and the CEO still receives very
substantial pay increases, that is a very troubling sign.
To help the market mechanisms that should control an issue like
executive compensation work better, we mandated much more extensive
proxy tables, 9 and we mandated taking advantage of computer graphics.'"
Instead of proxy statements that were nothing but words, we required
companies to throw in a couple of pictures. One of those pictures had to
include a chart showing the annual return to shareholders of that company
compared with the annual return of the market as a whole, as well as the
return to shareholders of competing companies." These performance
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1996); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1996)
(requiring disclosure of all information connected with executive compensation including
compensation committees members' names and the bases for their decisions).
9. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14, Sched. 14A, Item 10 (1996); see also 17 C.F.R. §
229.402 (Item 402) (1996).
10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14, Sched. 14A, Item 10 (a)(2)(i) (1996) (requiring use of
specified tabular format for disclosure of executive benefits plans); see also 17 C.F.R.

§ 229.402 (Item 402) (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), (f)(1), (i)(3)(i) (1996) (specifying
distinct tabular layouts for disclosing various types of executive compensation plans).
11. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(k)(1)(i)(ii) (1996).
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comparisons allow every shareholder to see quickly and easily whether the
company was performing, in relative terms, even with the market, much
better, or much worse. We felt that was important information for
shareholders to have when they were getting ready to decide whether to reelect the incumbent board.
The last thing that we did, which might be something portable to the
area of charitable giving, was to add a small essay. This can be very
dangerous in the disclosure area because if you give in to every idea for
expanding disclosure you can easily produce a disclosure document that is
unreadable. Everybody can think of something they need to add to
disclosure, and as the disclosure document gets larger and larger, at some
point one has succeeded in burying everything significant under layers of
trivia. Once people are overloaded, they do not continue reading. If there
is a disclosure on page 437 that says, "yesterday, I stole all the money,"
but nobody reads past page 436, the disclosure rule will have lost all
effect. To preserve the ability of disclosure to work you have to single
out the key things.
One of the things we did, at the risk of too much disclosure, was to
require that the compensation committee of the board had to include a
short description of the numeric or other factors that they used in reaching
a particular award.' z If the company was going downhill but the CEO's
pay had increased by one hundred percent, we thought the shareholders
should know what factors contributed to the committee's decision before
they voted to re-elect such a person as a director. Did sales go up even
though profits did not, or did the company obtain a new patent on
revolutionary technology which has not turned into profits yet, but may
down the road? There are many good reasons why a company that is not
generating current profits may nonetheless increase executive
compensation. This is particularly true in venture stage private companies,
but it also occurs in public companies. Therefore, we required the
compensation committee to give the shareholders greater insight into the
rationale for their decisions.
Along with mandating the descriptive material, we also required that
the members of the compensation committee should be identified with their
statements. This was our attempt to underline to the members of the board
their critical role in exercising their oversight role in a meaningful way.
For the most part, people do a good job running America's companies and
serving on their boards. However, this requirement improved the degree
to which people thought about how performance should be measured and
rewarded, and how boards should apply some consistency to those
decisions. The objective was to keep compensation decisions under market
mechanisms, and out of politics.
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(k) (Item 402 (k)) (1996).
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Where corporate governance abuses have gone beyond a tolerable
level, disclosure can be an effective corrective tool if used judiciously.
There are clear similarities in the issue of how wisely shareholder funds
are used in compensation and the issue of shareholder funds used for
charitable donations. On the other hand, the level of potential abuse in the
latter case is probably significantly less than the former, because there is
less direct self-interest at work (though spousal self-interest may be an
issue). To the degree issues of corporate donations rise as a concern,
greater disclosure can help enhance the effectiveness of board oversight.
Shareholder resolutions, a uniquely frustrating area of proxy law,
could conceivably also come into play in considering corporate charity.
The SEC has been bedeviled for decades with provisions of proxy rules
that require the Commission to act as referee on whether shareholders can
put a resolution about animal rights, smoking, employment practices,
environmental impacts, executive compensation, labor unions, or any other
subject, in a proxy.' 3 How the SEC got itself in this wonderful position
is not as clear as the fact that it is an unsatisfactory position for the
agency, creating cost and controversy without resolving issues. Under
current law, if an issue directly affects the value of a shareholder's shares,
he cannot propose a resolution on the grounds it is a matter of ordinary
business. That shareholders cannot express their views on the issues that4
most affect the value of their property is, at best, counter-intuitive.'
However, if a subject is completely irrelevant to the profitability of the
company, the shareholders are free to demand a vote in the name of social
policy engineering. 5 This rule is probably not the only area in which
Washington has things 180 degrees out of phase.
This is an area where the SEC has never been able to draw lines very
well, and the courts have also spent considerable time and tax dollars
deciding these intensely subjective "categorization" issues. Shareholder
rights in this area depend on a label, not sound principles or economic
interest. Sadly, very talented people, both on the courts and at the SEC,
spend large amounts of time refereeing disputes over whether or not a
resolution about animal rights should be included in a proxy statement,
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Roosevelt v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 429
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (excluding shareholder proposal concerning the cessation of production
of chloroflourocarbons and halon and the development of environmentally sound
alternatives, as relating to the ordinary business operations of the company).

15. See, e.g., Philip Morris Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,474, at 77,413 (Feb. 22, 1990) (allowing shareholder
proposal concerning cessation of the manufacture of tobacco products to be included in
proxy statement because it relates to the social and public policy issues surrounding
tobacco products, not the ordinary business operations of the company).

1186
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without any consistent tool for measuring when or how such discussions
should be made. If charitable donations is deemed to be a social issue it
can go on the ballot, but if it is deemed ordinary business it may stay off
the ballot, even if all the shareholders want to express their view.
There may now be an answer for that problem, as well as perhaps to
the problem of charitable contributions, in technology.
In state
governance, if five percent of the electorate, or whatever the state law
mandates, says that this is a resolution that should be on the ballot, the
resolution is added to the ballot and the people vote on it. However, if
you cannot get five percent of the people, or whatever the threshold is, to
say that this is a subject we all want to vote on, then the public is spared
the expense of getting it on the ballot.
The same kind of thing would work very well with shareholder
resolutions. If one can communicate with people and get the indication
that some minimum threshold of shareholders are genuinely concerned
about a subject, then put it on the ballot. However, the key element is
finding out what people are thinking about that issue. The Internet gives
us a way that we never had before to reach out and communicate with all
the shareholders, rather than relying on the intermediaries of the board,
the legal community or activist groups.
Any group wishing to publish a resolution for consideration could
offer it on a special corporate website. The proposed resolution and
supporting arguments could be easily and cheaply made available on the
web. If the issue demonstrates sufficient support through shareholder
approval, it could be placed on the proxy at the next opportunity. This
approach would allow shareholders a more flexible tool for communicating
views on issues such as corporate charity that are by their nature somewhat
in a gray area between business and social concerns.
The use of corporate funds for charitable donations, like other issues
of corporate governance generally, raises problems of information and of
accountability. Because of the risk of controversy, and the highly
subjective questions of charitable giving, this is not an area the SEC would
be likely to want to address.
Corporate donations are consistent with the first traditions of our
society, yet they do raise questions of who should oversee the wise use of
corporate resources. Here management must play the lead role, overseen
by the board. Ultimately, dividending excess cash to the shareholders may
be best, for they can then make their own selection of charities.

